Demand and Distribution in Integrated Economies by Rezai, Armon
INSTITUTE FOR
ECOLOGICAL
ECONOMICS
Vienna University of
Economics and Business
Working Paper Series
Nr. 10/Year 2/2016
Armon REZAI
Demand and Distribution in
Integrated Economies 
 August 2014 
 
 
 
Demand and Distribution in Integrated Economies* 
 
 
 
Armon Rezai† 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Aggregate demand is influenced by the functional income distribution of an 
economy and that of its trading partners. This relationship between income 
distribution and output is analyzed in a short-run two-country Neo-Kaleckian 
model. The effects of devaluation and redistribution are discussed in detail. 
Trade and redistribution within one country interact and output increases or 
decreases with changes in either depending on the specific distributional and 
exchange rate movements. The Marshall-Lerner condition is shown to be 
equivalent to the assumption of expansionary devaluation. If devaluation 
increases output, national redistribution policy toward wage earners is also 
more likely to be expansionary.  
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1  Introduction 
The functional distribution of income in an economy affects its levels of demand and output. 
This relationship between income distribution and demand is usually studied in a closed-economy or a 
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small-open-economy framework. A multi-country model with sufficient detail on the demand side 
allows the analytic investigation of the interrelation between demand and distribution not only within 
but also across economies. 
The idea that redistribution between income groups can increase the level of income is usually 
presented as a trade-off between wage- and profit-earners in a closed-economy framework (Dutt, 1984; 
Taylor, 1985; Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990). Some studies consider the possibility of trade but limit their 
analyses of the relationship between demand and distribution to the small open economy case. 
Movements in prices and quantities in the economy are assumed to have no effect on the rest of the 
world, which is taken to be exogenous (Krugman and Taylor, 1978; Blecker, 1989, 1999, 2002; Taylor, 
2004; La Marca, 2010). The concerns of this body of literature are more the interactions between 
openness to trade and the degree of competition and between growth and changes in the exchange rate 
(such as contractionary devaluation) than that between growth and distribution across countries. These 
cross-country effects cannot be discussed in a small open economy framework. Blecker (2011) provides 
a recent, comprehensive summary on the topic. 
If one abandons the small open economy assumption, important and interesting feed-back 
mechanisms come into play: increases in domestic demand also imply higher imports from trading 
partners which in turn stimulate demand in their economies and with it demand for exports from the 
domestic economy. Such interactions have been analyzed in terms of the foreign trade multiplier 
(Harrod, 1933) and multi-region/country models  (Goodwin, 1949; Metzler, 1950) long ago and 
subsequently were combined with elaborate input-output system specifying patterns of production 
(Leontief, 1953, Miyazawa, 1960, Goodwin, 1980). This kind of trade multiplier analysis only compares 
the distribution of income across countries. Functional income distribution within each country, 
however, is determined residually (see also the discussion in Taylor, 1995). 
In this paper I combine the insight that income distribution has an important effect on aggregate 
demand with the insight that the international trade network responds to changes in the domestic level 
of demand. I use two small open economy Kalecki-Keynes models in which demand is deficient---and 
therefore the limiting constraint---to form a closed system of bilateral trade. This set-up allows the 
analytic study of how shifts in distribution affect demand directly through their effects on consumption, 
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investment and imports, and indirectly through their effects on foreign output and foreign import 
demand (i.e. domestic export demand). Such ‘general equilibrium’ analysis has been conducted 
numerically before (Godley, 1999; Godley and Lavoie, 2007; von Arnim, 2009, 2010), but assumptions 
about parameter values can (and do) lead to a loss of generality. Accounting for trade repercussions in 
a closed multi-country system reverses some of the findings of partial equilibrium analysis on the 
relationship between demand and distribution. 
The key to understanding most results presented below is the fact that linking two economies 
through trade extends distributional conflict. The effect of internal redistribution between factors of 
income on domestic demand in a multi-country context hinges on multiple partial effects which need 
careful consideration: its effect on domestic investment and saving, its effect on the real exchange rate, 
and the effects of a change in the real exchange rate on domestic and foreign demand. These partial 
effects are discussed in the following sections: the model is presented in section 2, domestic and foreign 
levels of income and the real exchange rate are considered in sections 3 and 4, and the effects of 
devaluation and redistribution on domestic and foreign output are studied in sections 5 and 6. Section 7 
concludes. 
While focusing on the short-run dynamics and ignoring the balance of payment constraint, the 
results on the international effects of domestic redistribution contribute to the existing explanations of 
regional growth divergences. The model used here is very similar to the one of McCombie (1993) in 
that tradition, but relaxes the assumption of constant terms of trade. Dutt (2002) also uses a two-country 
setting and endogenizes the real exchange rate, but assumes the Marshall-Lerner condition to hold. Von 
Arnim et al. (2014) use a model very similar to the one presented here but their assumptions do not 
allow analytic treatment except under special cases. The results of this paper also extend to the large 
literature on uneven development (Kaldor, 1970; Taylor, 1981; Dutt, 1990). Considering positive feed-
back effects of increased domestic import demand ameliorates some of the bleak results about 
international trade and the effectiveness of domestic stimulus policies. Integrating an economy in a 
regional or world trade network can lead to the increase of income in all countries, but not necessarily 
so. This highlights the need of international coordination of economic policy (see also von Arnim et al., 
2014; Kiefer and Rada, 2014). 
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2  Model 
The general equilibrium analysis is based on two economies each of which is characterized by the 
standard short-run Kalecki-Keynes model. The variant below is similar to the ones of Taylor (2004b, 
ch.7) and Godley and Lavoie (2007, ch.12), since all imports enter the economy through the business 
sector. Business combines import and labor inputs to produce the final good. 
Before spelling out the model details, I review the effects of trade in a simple two-country model 
of the real, demand side. With 𝑠𝑠 the saving rate, 𝑖𝑖 the marginal propensity to invest, 𝑚𝑚 the marginal 
propensity to import, and 𝑒𝑒 the exchange rate, the identity (𝐼𝐼 − 𝑆𝑆) + (𝐸𝐸 −𝑀𝑀) = 0 can be re-arranged 
to the well-known equations: 
𝑌𝑌 = 1(𝑠𝑠 − 𝑖𝑖) + 𝑚𝑚 𝑒𝑒 (𝐼𝐼 + 𝑚𝑚∗ 𝑌𝑌∗)                𝑌𝑌∗ = 1(𝑠𝑠∗ − 𝑖𝑖∗) + 𝑚𝑚∗ 𝑒𝑒⁄ (𝐼𝐼∗ + 𝑚𝑚 𝑌𝑌) 
where foreign variables are starred. Home output, 𝑌𝑌, is determined by domestic autonomous investment 
plus export demand times the multiplier, 𝜆𝜆 = (𝑠𝑠 − 𝑖𝑖) + 𝑚𝑚 𝑒𝑒 (and 𝜆𝜆∗ = (𝑠𝑠∗ − 𝑖𝑖∗) + 𝑚𝑚∗ 𝑒𝑒⁄ ). Considering 
the adding-up constraints that exports from one country have to be another countries imports, one can 
solve output levels as functions of exogenous investment demands times the domestic and trade 
multipliers: 
𝑌𝑌 = 11 −𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚∗𝜆𝜆 𝜆𝜆∗ 1𝜆𝜆 �𝐼𝐼 + 𝑚𝑚∗ 𝐼𝐼∗𝜆𝜆∗ �                 𝑌𝑌∗ = 11 −𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚∗𝜆𝜆 𝜆𝜆∗ 1𝜆𝜆∗ �𝐼𝐼∗ + 𝑚𝑚 𝐼𝐼𝜆𝜆 � 
The small open economy multiplier is supplemented by the trade multiplier �1 −𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚∗
𝜆𝜆 𝜆𝜆∗ �−1 to capture the 
circular structure of the trade network. Autonomous injections in the closed system can only stem from 
autonomous investment demand (in this model). In the case of home output, this is domestic autonomous 
investment demand 𝐼𝐼 plus foreign investment demand in the form of domestic exports (𝑚𝑚∗ 𝐼𝐼∗ 𝜆𝜆∗⁄ ). An 
increase in either autonomous investment demand increases output in both economies; an increase in 
either saving rate decreases output. An increase in a country’s propensity to import lowers its output but 
increases the other country’s output. The overall effect on world output is ambiguous, depending on the 
saving-investment differentials in each country. Devaluation of home currency (meaning an increase in 
𝑒𝑒) has ambiguous effects on domestic output: home imports become more expensive and the multiplier 
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decreases (𝜆𝜆 increases), but the foreign multiplier increases (𝜆𝜆∗ falls). In general, devaluation will be 
expansionary if home is sufficiently small relative to foreign (𝑌𝑌 ≪ 𝑌𝑌∗).3 
The simple model discussed in the previous paragraphs assumes that the distribution of income 
is irrelevant to macroeconomic equilibrium. Macroeconomic variables, however, are influenced by the 
(functional) distribution of income in the economy. Differences in saving rates for capital and wage 
incomes are persistent and large (Carvalho and Rezai, 2013); profitability considerations enter any 
sensible investment decision. This implies that the aggregate investment and saving are functions of 
income distribution. To see how distribution affects aggregate demand and output within and across 
countries, Neo- Kaleckian features need to be introduced. 
Table 1 spells out the model equations. Foreign variables are still starred. Equations (1) through 
(6) characterize the home economy with each starred equation characterizing the foreign counterpart. 
Both economies are identical in their functional (linear) forms. Equation (1) states that the price of the 
final good is set by a mark-up on variable cost components (labor and import) as it is customary in most 
economies for foreign goods to enter the domestic market through the business sector (i.e. retailers). 
Import demand is a linear function in the exchange rate, e, and the price of the foreign good in foreign 
currency, P∗. This linear function implies that home import elasticity equals 1. Von Arnim et al. (2014) 
allow for variable import demand in a similar model. Equation (1) implicitly assumes that the cost of 
imports is included in total cost of output so that the value of output PX is greater than value added (i.e. 
GDP).4 Most results are presented for both variables and the difference is shown to be irrelevant. 
 
Table 1: Two-country model of demand and distribution 
Home macroeconomic relationships 
 𝑃𝑃 = 1
1−𝜋𝜋
(𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 + 𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃∗𝑎𝑎) (1) 
 𝕊𝕊 = [𝑠𝑠𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 + 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤(1− 𝜋𝜋 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)]𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 (2) 
 
                                                          
3 The formal conditions are: 𝑑𝑑(𝑌𝑌+𝑌𝑌∗)
𝑑𝑑 𝑚𝑚 ≶ 0 ⟺ 𝑠𝑠 − 𝑖𝑖 − 𝑒𝑒(𝑠𝑠∗ − 𝑖𝑖∗) ≶ 0, 𝑑𝑑 𝑌𝑌𝑑𝑑 𝑒𝑒 = − 11−𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚∗
𝜆𝜆 𝜆𝜆∗ 1𝜆𝜆 �𝑌𝑌 𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒 + 𝑚𝑚∗𝜆𝜆∗ 𝑌𝑌∗ 𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆∗𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒 �  ≷ 0 and  
𝑑𝑑(𝑌𝑌+𝑌𝑌∗)
𝑑𝑑 𝑒𝑒 = − 11−𝑚𝑚 𝑚𝑚∗
𝜆𝜆 𝜆𝜆∗ �1𝜆𝜆 �𝑌𝑌 𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒 + 𝑚𝑚∗𝜆𝜆∗ 𝑌𝑌∗ 𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆∗𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒 � + 1𝜆𝜆∗ �𝑌𝑌∗ 𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆∗𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒 + 𝑚𝑚𝜆𝜆 𝑌𝑌 𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒�� ≶ 0    with 𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒 = 𝑚𝑚 > 0 and 𝜕𝜕𝜆𝜆∗𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒 = −𝑚𝑚∗𝑒𝑒2 < 0. 
4 Reformulating (1) gives: 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑃𝑃 + 𝜋𝜋𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 + 𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃∗𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃. 
 𝕀𝕀 = 𝑃𝑃 𝐼𝐼[𝜋𝜋,𝑢𝑢] 𝐾𝐾 (3) 
 
  𝕄𝕄 = 𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃∗𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃 (4)  
 
 𝔼𝔼 ≡ 𝑒𝑒𝕄𝕄∗ = 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎∗𝑃𝑃∗ (5) 
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Foreign macroeconomic relationships 
 𝑃𝑃∗ = 1
1−𝜋𝜋∗
(𝑤𝑤∗𝑤𝑤∗ + 1
𝑒𝑒
𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎∗) (1*) 
 𝕊𝕊∗ = �𝑠𝑠𝜋𝜋∗𝜋𝜋∗ + 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤∗ �1 − 𝜋𝜋∗ − 𝑎𝑎∗𝜌𝜌 �� 𝑃𝑃∗𝑃𝑃∗ (2*) 
 𝕀𝕀∗ = 𝑃𝑃∗ 𝐼𝐼∗[𝜋𝜋∗,𝑢𝑢∗] 𝐾𝐾∗ (3*) 
 𝕄𝕄∗ = 𝑃𝑃
𝑒𝑒
𝑎𝑎∗𝑃𝑃∗ (4*) 
 𝔼𝔼∗ ≡ 1
𝑒𝑒
𝕄𝕄 = 𝑃𝑃∗𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃 (5*) 
Equilibrium Conditions: 
 𝑢𝑢 ̇  = 1
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃
  𝛾𝛾  [(𝔼𝔼 −𝕄𝕄) + (𝕀𝕀 − 𝕊𝕊)]   = 0  (6) 
 𝑢𝑢∗̇ = 1
𝑃𝑃∗𝑃𝑃∗
𝛾𝛾∗[(𝔼𝔼∗ −𝕄𝕄∗) + (𝕀𝕀∗ − 𝕊𝕊∗)] = 0  (6*) 
Definitions: 
 𝑢𝑢 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃/(𝑃𝑃𝐾𝐾);          𝑢𝑢∗ = 𝑃𝑃∗𝑃𝑃∗/(𝑃𝑃∗𝐾𝐾∗) (7) 
 𝑎𝑎 = 𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃∗
𝑃𝑃
 (8) 
 1 = 𝜓𝜓 + 𝜋𝜋 + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 = 𝜓𝜓∗ + 𝜋𝜋∗ + 𝑎𝑎∗
𝜌𝜌
 (9) 
 
The analysis is carried out in real terms, scaled to capital stock. Output scaled to capital stock, 
𝑢𝑢, in eqn. (7) is determined by domestic and foreign sources of demand. Macroeconomic equilibrium in 
eqn. (6) requires that aggregate injections equal aggregate leakage. In the closed economy, this occurs 
if saving equals investment. Aggregate saving, 𝕊𝕊, in eqn. (2) is determined by the behavior of capitalists 
and workers, where the latter's share in income is 1 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 (using eqn. (1) to derive eqn. (9)).1 
Aggregate investment, 𝕀𝕀, in eqn. (3) is defined as an implicit function of output and profitability per unit 
of capital. In the open economy, the difference between exports 𝔼𝔼, eqn. (4), and imports 𝕄𝕄, eqn.  (5), 
provides an additional source of demand injections. Equations (7) through (9) are definitions of the real 
exchange rate, capacity utilization, and the wage share.  
 The novel aspect of this model is the algebraic consideration of the effects of distribution if the 
open economy accounts are closed by adding structure to the rest of this Neo-Kaleckian world. The 
adding-up constraint dictates that the volume of home imports has to equal foreign exports and vice 
versa. Each country's export demand is determined by the other's import demand. Algebraically, adding 
up implies that 𝔼𝔼 ≡ 𝑒𝑒𝕄𝕄∗ and 𝔼𝔼∗ ≡ 1
𝑒𝑒
𝕄𝕄. 
                                                          
1 With value added 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉 = (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)𝑢𝑢 , the wage share definition 𝜓𝜓 = 1 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎  ensures that shares of wages 
and profit exhaust value added (𝜋𝜋 + 𝜓𝜓)𝑢𝑢 = (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)𝑢𝑢 = 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉. 
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Clearly, there are many important aspects of international economics that are left out of 
consideration in this model. It focuses on the short run and the real side of the world economy; increases 
in output imply higher utilization of capital and labor. For simplicity, capital and labor are assumed to 
be immobile across countries and investment to be influenced only by domestic variables, such as 
profitability and economic activity. International competition and competitiveness enter the model 
through their indirect effects on the real exchange rate. Domestic and international financial aspects like 
interest rates and asset stocks and flows are neglected. Such extensions would most importantly 
determine the nominal exchange rate, 𝑒𝑒, which is assumed given in this set-up.  
 
3  International Competition and the Mark-Up 
In the open economy, the real exchange rate, 𝑎𝑎, adjusts to scale the home economy to the rest 
of the world. As pointed out by Taylor (2004, p.254), allowing for foreign trade introduces foreign as a 
new claimant in the distributional conflict over income in eqn.  (9). International competition and home 
and foreign mark-up primarily determine the real exchange rate—the terms of trade. Before determining 
equilibrium output levels, the domestic and foreign price levels are discussed in this section. Through 
equations  (1) and (1*), the domestic price level equals:  
𝑃𝑃 = 1
1−𝜋𝜋
(𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 + 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎∗𝑃𝑃∗) = 1
�1−
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗(1−𝜋𝜋)(1−𝜋𝜋∗)�
1(1−𝜋𝜋) (𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤 + 𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎 𝑤𝑤∗𝑏𝑏∗1−𝜋𝜋∗). (10) 
(for derivations see appendix B). Prices depend on variable cost, which--when considering the whole 
world as a closed system--reduce to labor inputs. For home business, variable cost breaks down into 
direct domestic labor input and indirect imported foreign, marked-up labor input. The general 
equilibrium feed-back also introduces the trade-based multiplier (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗(1−𝜋𝜋)(1−𝜋𝜋∗))−1. As in the closed 
economy, prices are still anchored by historically determined nominal wages. 
Blecker (1989, 2002) criticizes the rigidity of the usual mark-up rule for its inability to capture 
the effects of international competition on home's pricing decision and adopts an international closure 
instead with foreign determinants driving profit share and mark-up. The formulation chosen here 
overcomes this criticism. Home business responds to changes in foreign parameters. An increase in the 
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foreign profit share or wage rate increases prices abroad and to a lesser extent at home. The real exchange 
rate depreciates (rises) and home competitiveness increases.  
Using equation (10) and its foreign counterpart we have algebraically, 
𝑎𝑎 = 𝑒𝑒 𝑃𝑃∗
𝑃𝑃
= 𝑒𝑒 1−𝜋𝜋
1−𝜋𝜋∗
(𝑤𝑤∗𝑏𝑏∗+1
𝑒𝑒
𝑎𝑎∗
𝑤𝑤 𝑏𝑏
1−𝜋𝜋
)(𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏+𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤∗𝑏𝑏∗
1−𝜋𝜋∗
) = (1−𝜋𝜋) 𝑒𝑒+𝑎𝑎∗(𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏 𝑤𝑤∗𝑏𝑏∗⁄ )(1−𝜋𝜋∗) (𝑤𝑤𝑏𝑏 𝑤𝑤∗𝑏𝑏∗⁄ )+𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑎. (11) 
And, as can be seen easily, 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎/𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋∗ > 0. Conversely, an increase in the domestic profit share decreases 
𝑎𝑎, 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎/𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋 < 0. 
 
4  Output Determination 
Output is determined through independent investment and saving behavior. In a simple closed 
economy, output adjusts such that domestic investment equals domestic saving. Distribution affects both 
of these variables through profitability considerations entering the investment function and differential 
saving rates. Depending those two effects, redistribution toward wages can increase or decrease output. 
If aggregate demand increases in the wage share (profit share), it is called wage-led (profit-led). In the 
multi-country model considered here, equation (6) shows that net exports constitute an additional source 
of demand. The aim of the paper is to study the relationship between demand and distribution in such a 
multi-country model. 
Equations (6) and (6*) form a system of differential equations which can be analyzed using 
standard dynamical methods. Before applying these, it makes sense to investigate the mechanism 
establishing equilibrium. Let 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑 stand for domestic net borrowing (e.g. excess investment) and 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓 
for foreign net borrowing (the trade surplus) capturing foreign demand (see Godley and Cripps, 1983). 
In equilibrium, macroeconomic balance in (6) requires  
 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑 + 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓 = 0           (12) 
Domestic net borrowing has to be financed by negative net borrowing (positive net lending) 
from abroad. Since the only source of external finance is foreign, we have 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑 = −𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓 = 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓∗ =
−𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑
∗  or 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑 + 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑∗ = 0. It is not possible for both economies to simultaneously rely on financing 
from abroad; net borrowing of the whole system has to equal zero. This is, of course, a mere restatement 
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of the adding up constraint that both economies cannot be having current account surpluses (or deficits) 
at the same time.  
Using (6) and the assumption that the investment function is multiplicative in 𝑢𝑢, 𝐼𝐼[𝜋𝜋,𝑢𝑢] =
𝜄𝜄[𝜋𝜋] + 𝐼𝐼𝑢𝑢 𝑢𝑢, the small open economies’ output can be determined in multiplier form as in the simple 
model at the beginning of section 2:2 
                   𝑢𝑢 = 1
𝜇𝜇
(𝜄𝜄[𝜋𝜋] + 𝑎𝑎∗𝑢𝑢∗)    and     𝑢𝑢∗ = 1
𝜇𝜇∗
(𝜄𝜄∗[𝜋𝜋∗] + 𝑎𝑎 𝑢𝑢) (13) 
with multipliers 𝜇𝜇 = [𝑠𝑠𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 + 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤(1− 𝜋𝜋 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)] + 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 − 𝐼𝐼𝑢𝑢 and 𝜇𝜇∗ = [𝑠𝑠𝜋𝜋∗𝜋𝜋∗ + 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤∗ (1− 𝜋𝜋∗ − 𝑎𝑎∗/𝑎𝑎)] +
𝑎𝑎∗/𝑎𝑎 − 𝐼𝐼𝑢𝑢∗  and autonomous investment demands, 𝜄𝜄[𝜋𝜋] and 𝜄𝜄∗[𝜋𝜋∗], now functions of functional income 
distribution.3 The circular structure of the trade network, again, introduces the trade multiplier: 
   𝑢𝑢 = 1
1−
𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎∗
𝜇𝜇 𝜇𝜇∗
1
𝜇𝜇
�𝜄𝜄[𝜋𝜋] + 𝑎𝑎∗
𝜇𝜇∗
𝜄𝜄∗[𝜋𝜋∗]�   and     𝑢𝑢∗ = 1
1−
𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎∗
𝜇𝜇 𝜇𝜇∗
1
𝜇𝜇∗
�𝜄𝜄∗[𝜋𝜋∗] + 𝑎𝑎
𝜇𝜇
𝜄𝜄[𝜋𝜋]�. 4 (14) 
The only sources of demand available to home are now autonomous home investment and 
autonomous foreign investment in the form of export demand.5 An increase in either autonomous 
demand component increases aggregate demand: 
                      𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝜋𝜋] = 11−𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎∗
𝜇𝜇 𝜇𝜇∗
1
𝜇𝜇
> 0    and    𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢∗
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑[𝜋𝜋] = 11−𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎∗
𝜇𝜇 𝜇𝜇∗
1
𝜇𝜇∗
 𝑎𝑎
𝜇𝜇
𝜄𝜄[𝜋𝜋] > 0. (15) 
Home (and foreign) domestic demand is now a function of income distribution through its effect 
on investment. Profit shares, however, also enter the multipliers through their effect on aggregate 
domestic and foreign saving. As seen in the previous section, profit shares also shift the real exchange 
rate.  
  
5  Effects of Devaluation 
To understand the aggregate effects of redistribution (through shifts in the profit shares) on 
output, I first establish its partial effects through devaluation. The effects of devaluation on capacity 
                                                          
2 Foreign variables have to additionally be rescaled by 𝜅𝜅 = 𝐾𝐾∗/𝐾𝐾 and the real exchange rate, 𝑎𝑎 = 𝑒𝑒𝑃𝑃∗/𝑃𝑃. Since 𝜅𝜅 
serves no particular purpose, units are chosen such that 𝜅𝜅 ≡ 1. 
3 The stability of the system is warranted by the Keynesian stability conditions  𝜇𝜇, 𝜇𝜇∗ > 0. 
4 The introduction of the trade multiplier makes the stability condition more restrictive: 𝜇𝜇 𝜇𝜇∗ > 𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎∗ > 0. 
5 Thirwall (2011) reviews the broad literature on balance-of-payment constraints. It is important to note that in 
the absence of such complications, aggregate demand can only be determined by its autonomous components 
and the multiplier rather than export and import components. 
 10 
utilization have long been discussed by international and development economists. In the simple model 
in section 2, the effects of devaluation (an increase in 𝑒𝑒) are ambiguous and depend on changes in the 
multipliers.6 Devaluation, independent of its source, increases or decreases output: 
𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒
= − 1
1−
𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎∗
𝜇𝜇 𝜇𝜇∗
1
𝜇𝜇
�𝑢𝑢
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇
𝜕𝜕𝜌𝜌
+ 𝑎𝑎∗
𝜇𝜇∗
𝑢𝑢∗
𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇∗
𝜕𝜕𝜌𝜌
�
𝜕𝜕𝜌𝜌
𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒
≷ 0    (16) 
with 𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎⁄ = 𝑎𝑎(1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤) > 0, 𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇∗ 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎⁄ = −𝑎𝑎∗(1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤∗ ) 𝑎𝑎2⁄ < 0, and 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒⁄ > 0.7 Again, domestic 
output falls if the effect of the devaluation on the domestic multiplier is large, the effect on the foreign 
multiplier small, and if the difference between the domestic and foreign output is large.  
The effect of devaluation on both multipliers now depends on functional income distribution 
through differential saving rates. In the simple model of section 2 the effect on the domestic multiplier 
expression, 𝜇𝜇, is the equivalent of 𝑎𝑎, since devaluation increases the import bill and with it external 
leakage (see also footnote 3). The partial effect of the devaluation, 𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎⁄ , is 𝑎𝑎(1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤) in this model. 
This is because the devaluation tilts distribution in favor of foreign, thereby affecting internal demand. 
With the profit share fixed by the mark-up rule, the wage share has to adjust and the associated leakage 
through workers' saving falls. The reduction of – 𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤 compensates some of the effects of the higher 
import bill. The same applies for the effect on devaluation on the foreign multiplier. Restating (16), the 
aggregate effect is 
𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒
≷ 0 ⇔  −𝑎𝑎(1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤)𝑢𝑢 + 𝑎𝑎∗2𝜇𝜇∗ 𝜌𝜌2 (1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤∗ )𝑢𝑢∗ ≷ 0. (16’) 
In demand-driven models, aggregate demand generally increases if income is redistributed away 
from high-saving toward low-saving groups. In this model, there are four income groups but only 
domestic and foreign workers are affected by devaluation. Domestic and foreign profit earners are 
unaffected through the mark-up rule. Equation (16’) shows that devaluation can only increase domestic 
output if domestic workers save significantly more than their foreign counterparts or if the import 
coefficient and the size of the domestic economy is sufficiently small relative to foreign. In this case, 
                                                          
6 Typically, one considers the effect of a nominal devaluation (𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒). Here nominal devaluation always leads to 
real devaluation since the exchange rate only enters through the real exchange rate and 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 / 𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 > 0. In the 
following sections devaluation means real devaluation with the understanding that real devaluation is brought 
about through nominal devaluation (𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒) or shifts in profits shares (𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋). 
7 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎 𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒⁄ = 𝑎𝑎 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏∗ 𝑤𝑤 𝑤𝑤∗
𝑃𝑃(𝑎𝑎∗𝑏𝑏𝑤𝑤+𝑏𝑏∗𝑒𝑒𝑤𝑤∗(1−𝜋𝜋)) > 0. Restating (18) for GDP: 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 = 𝑑𝑑(1−𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌)𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 = −𝑎𝑎 𝑢𝑢 + (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 ≷ 0. 
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devaluation shifts disposable income toward low-saving groups and output can increase. Conversely, 
appreciation can be expansionary if domestic workers have sufficiently lower saving propensities than 
their foreign counterparts.  
While there might be a conflict between workers over a given amount of income, redistribution 
across countries, through movements in the exchange rate, can increase income of both. This case is 
rarely considered in models of growth and distribution, given that it is only apparent when considering 
a multi-country model as a closed system (in the small open economy case in (13) an appreciation always 
lowers output). Numerical ‘general equilibrium’ models of growth and distribution usually do not 
consider this possibility.8 Analytically the condition for devaluation to increase world output is 
𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢+𝑢𝑢∗)
𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒
= − 1
1−
𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎∗
𝜇𝜇 𝜇𝜇∗ �(1 + 𝑎𝑎𝜇𝜇∗) 𝑢𝑢𝜇𝜇 𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇𝜕𝜕𝜌𝜌 + (1 + 𝑎𝑎∗𝜇𝜇 ) 𝑢𝑢∗𝜇𝜇∗ 𝜕𝜕𝜇𝜇∗𝜕𝜕𝜌𝜌 � 𝜕𝜕𝜌𝜌𝜕𝜕𝑒𝑒 ≷ 0. (17) 
Expression (17) is identical to the condition for expansionary devaluation given for the simple model in 
footnote 3. The effects of distribution are captured in effects of devaluation on the multiplier as discussed 
above. Again, devaluation can increase world output, benefiting potentially all income earners, if 
domestic workers save significantly larger portions of their income than their foreign counterparts and 
if the import coefficient and the size of the domestic economy is sufficiently smaller than foreign. 
In the macroeconomic analysis of devaluation, one usually invokes the "Marshall-Lerner" (ML) 
condition. It ensures that devaluation leads to an improvement in the current account. In the present 
model, the ML condition implies that any devaluation is expansionary for the domestic economy. To 
see this, it is useful to return to the net borrowing analysis of section 4. Restated in net borrowing, the 
ML condition assumes that foreign net borrowing increases as the economy depreciates, 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑓𝑓/𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 > 0, 
and by (13) this means that domestic net borrowing has to fall, 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑/𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 < 0. The economy needs to 
generate more net lending to finance foreign purchase of home exports, in light of an increase in home 
net exports.  
Algebraically, using (2) and (3) we have, 𝑁𝑁𝐵𝐵𝑑𝑑 = 1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 (𝕀𝕀 − 𝕊𝕊)  =  𝜄𝜄[𝜋𝜋] − (𝜇𝜇 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) 𝑢𝑢 and  
 𝑑𝑑𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝜌𝜌
= 𝑎𝑎 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤 𝑢𝑢 − (𝜇𝜇 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) 𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢𝜕𝜕𝜌𝜌  (18) 
                                                          
8 e.g. Lavoie and Godley only found a contractionary effect in their numerical simulations (Godley and Lavoie, 
2007, p.182); von Arnim et al (2014) find the possibility of expansionary devaluation without discussing the 
implications. 
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which can only be negative if the devaluation is expansionary (𝜕𝜕𝑢𝑢 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎⁄ > 0).9 The assumption of the ML 
condition to hold for home automatically implies that devaluation is expansionary for home and that the 
ML condition simultaneously holds for foreign as the depreciation (i.e. foreign appreciation) increases 
the foreign trade deficit. 
 
6  Effects of Redistribution 
The idea that redistribution between income groups can increase the income of all is an old idea 
dating back to Kalecki and Steindl. It is usually presented as a trade-off between wage- and profit-
earners in a closed-economy framework. The seminal papers on this subject are Dutt (1984), Taylor 
(1985), and Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). Empirical investigations based on these contributions (Bowles 
and Boyer, 1995; Gordon, 1995; Naastepad, 2006; Naastepad and Storm, 2007; Ederer and 
Stockhammer, 2007; Stockhammer, Onaran and Ederer, 2009; Hein and Vogel, 2008; Galanis and 
Onaran, 2012) often had to accommodate the fact that real economies are always linked to the world 
economy in some form. Most studies find that small open economies (like the Netherlands or Austria) 
are more likely to be profit-led than large, relatively closed ones (like the US or the Euro area as a 
whole). As Gordon (1995) put it early on: "[...] the estimated coefficients from the net-export equation 
are instrumental in determining the final sign of the utilization function" (p. 361). Based on these 
findings, the view emerged that increasing openness of an economy pushes demand necessarily toward 
a profit-led regime. However, given the ambiguous output response to devaluation, trade openness could 
very well push demand regimes in either direction. 
In a closed economy, redistribution to profits increases output if the investment response to this 
increase in profitability is strong and the difference in the saving rates of wage- and profit-earners is 
small, i.e. 𝜄𝜄[𝜋𝜋]′ − (𝑠𝑠𝜋𝜋 − 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤)𝑢𝑢 > 0. In an open economy an increase in the mark-up additionally leads to 
a loss in competitiveness as  ∂𝜌𝜌
∂𝜋𝜋
< 0. 
Taking the full derivative of (14) with respect to 𝜋𝜋 yields 
𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋
= 1
1−
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗
𝜇𝜇 𝜇𝜇∗
1
𝜇𝜇
�𝜄𝜄[𝜋𝜋]′ − (𝑠𝑠𝜋𝜋 − 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤)𝑢𝑢� + ∂𝑢𝑢∂𝜌𝜌 ∂𝜌𝜌∂𝜋𝜋. (19) 
                                                          
9 Note that (𝜇𝜇 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) = [𝑠𝑠𝜋𝜋𝜋𝜋 + 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤(1 − 𝜋𝜋 − 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)] − 𝐼𝐼𝑢𝑢 > 0 by the Keynesian stability condition. 
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The first term captures the closed economy output effects of redistribution away from wages 
toward profits. The second term captures the redistributive effects of real appreciation, ∂𝑎𝑎/ ∂𝜋𝜋 < 0. 
Trade openness pushes an economy toward profit-led demand, increasing (19), if the appreciation has a 
positive effect on output, i.e. if 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢/𝑑𝑑𝑎𝑎 < 0. If depreciation increases output (which is necessarily the 
case if the ML condition holds), the (closed) economy's demand regime becomes more wage-led. 10 
The effect of redistribution between wages and profits within one country hinges not only on 
national distributional conflict, but also the conflict between the home and foreign. The international 
dimension of conflict is captured through the shift in the exchange rate. Using (16’) in (19), makes this 
three-fold conflict apparent:  
𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋
= 1
1−
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗
𝜇𝜇 𝜇𝜇∗
1
𝜇𝜇
�𝜄𝜄[𝜋𝜋]′ − (𝑠𝑠𝜋𝜋 − 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤)𝑢𝑢 −  �𝑎𝑎(1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤)𝑢𝑢 − 𝑎𝑎∗2𝜇𝜇∗ 𝜌𝜌2 (1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤∗ )𝑢𝑢∗� ∂𝜌𝜌∂𝜋𝜋�. (19’) 
A change in the domestic profits share leads to a change in profitability and a redistribution of income 
(and saving) between wages and profits internally. However, it also leads to a change in the real 
exchange rate, implying a redistribution of income across home and foreign workers, externally (as 
discussed in section 5). 
The effect of domestic redistribution on the trading partner’s output also decomposes into direct 
effect of redistribution on domestic output and the indirect effects of domestic appreciation, 
𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢∗
𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋
= 1
1−
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗
𝜇𝜇 𝜇𝜇∗
1
𝜇𝜇∗
𝑎𝑎
𝜇𝜇
�𝜄𝜄[𝜋𝜋]′ − (𝑠𝑠𝜋𝜋 − 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤)𝑢𝑢� + ∂𝑢𝑢∗∂𝜌𝜌 ∂𝜌𝜌∂𝜋𝜋. (20) 
Over the past decades labor shares have been falling in most OECD countries. Using (19) and 
(20) it is possible to investigate the effects of a concerted reflation of labor shares. First, consider the 
effect of a global reflation on domestic output, 
  𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋
+ 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋∗
= 1
1−
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗
𝜇𝜇 𝜇𝜇∗
1
𝜇𝜇
�𝜄𝜄[𝜋𝜋]′ − (𝑠𝑠𝜋𝜋 − 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤)𝑢𝑢 + 𝑎𝑎∗𝜇𝜇∗  �𝜄𝜄∗[𝜋𝜋∗]′ − (𝑠𝑠𝜋𝜋∗ − 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤∗ )𝑢𝑢∗�� + 
∂𝑢𝑢
∂𝜌𝜌
�
∂𝜌𝜌
∂𝜋𝜋
+ ∂𝜌𝜌
∂𝜋𝜋∗
�.  (21) 
Domestic output’s response to reflation in both economies consists of the weighted sum of 
national closed-economy demand regimes and the response to the reflation-induced exchange rate 
                                                          
10 In terms of GDP, 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃
𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋
= 𝑑𝑑(1−𝑎𝑎𝜌𝜌)𝑢𝑢
𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋
= −𝑎𝑎 𝑢𝑢 ∂𝜌𝜌
∂𝜋𝜋
+ 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢
𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋
≷ 0. 
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movement. The direct change in aggregate demand is equivalent to that of a change in autonomous 
investment in (15) with the important difference that demand can change in either direction, depending 
on the national closed-economy demand regimes. Coordinated reflation has an ambiguous effect on the 
real exchange rate as structural parameters differ across countries. If the exchange rate responds more 
strongly to changes in the foreign than the home profit share, the overall effect is real depreciation (𝑎𝑎 
increases). In such a situation, domestic output could decrease even if the national (closed-economy) 
demand regimes are both wage-led. This effect cancels out if both economies are identical in their 
pricing behavior, reducing home output’s response to the weighted sum of closed-economy demand 
regimes.11 There would only be internal redistribution between wages and profits and international 
effects would be limited to the extent that internal redistribution changes output and with it import 
demand. 
The effect of coordinated redistributive policy on world output is given by extension of (21): 
   𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢+𝑢𝑢∗)
𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋
+ 𝑑𝑑(𝑢𝑢+𝑢𝑢∗)
𝑑𝑑𝜋𝜋∗
= 1
1−
𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗
𝜇𝜇 𝜇𝜇∗ �
1
𝜇𝜇
�1 + 𝑎𝑎
𝜇𝜇∗
� �𝜄𝜄[𝜋𝜋]′ − (𝑠𝑠𝜋𝜋 − 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤)𝑢𝑢� + 1𝜇𝜇∗ �1 + 𝑎𝑎∗𝜇𝜇 �  �𝜄𝜄∗[𝜋𝜋∗]′ − (𝑠𝑠𝜋𝜋∗ − 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤∗ )𝑢𝑢∗�� 
+ ∂ 𝑢𝑢+𝑢𝑢∗
∂𝜌𝜌
�
∂𝜌𝜌
∂𝜋𝜋
+ ∂𝜌𝜌
∂𝜋𝜋∗
�.         (22) 
The total effect captures all of partial effects previously discussed. Redistribution has a direct 
effect on the investment and saving through the national (closed-economy) demand regime. Changes in 
these demand regimes have themselves a direct effect (of 1) and indirect effects through changes in 
import demand (𝑎𝑎/𝜇𝜇∗). These effects are based on national distributional conflict between earners of 
wages and profits. Redistribution also influences international conflict between home and foreign 
workers (see (16’)). This type of distributional conflict is captured through movements in the real 
exchange rate. Coordinated reflation can increase or decrease the real exchange rate and this change in 
the exchange has itself an ambiguous effect on world output. Distributional conflict between profit 
earners across countries is muted through the particular mark-up assumption that variable cost includes 
both labor and imported inputs. 
 
7  Discussion 
                                                          
11 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎/𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋 + 𝜕𝜕𝑎𝑎/𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋∗ > 0 ⇔ (𝜋𝜋 − 𝜋𝜋∗) + (𝑎𝑎/𝑅𝑅 − 𝑎𝑎∗𝑅𝑅) < 0 with  𝑅𝑅 = 𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤/(𝑤𝑤∗𝑤𝑤∗ 𝑒𝑒). 
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Aggregate demand and output in an economy are functions of its functional distribution of 
income and that of its trading partners. Most models of demand and distribution focus on the closed 
economy and the interaction between demand and domestic income distribution. Issues of international 
economics are discussed in the small open economy context. In recent years (large-scale) models have 
been introduced to study the interaction of distribution in multiple economies numerically. 
The main finding of the two-country model studied in this paper is that national policies of 
demand management and redistribution can have unintended macroeconomic effects. The outcomes of 
such policies depend on the structural parameters of both economies with relative size of the economies 
being one important determinant. The key to understanding this wide range of possible outcomes is the 
fact that introducing foreign trade in the model extends distributional conflict. Foreign income groups 
enter as claimants to income in the form of the trade deficit. The real exchange rate provides the link 
between home and foreign income earners. 
Devaluation shifts distribution in favor of foreign. The price of domestic imports increases, 
decreasing the multiplier. With profits shares fixed by the mark-up rule, labor’s share in domestic output 
falls. Foreign labor’s share, however, increases by the same logic. The Paradox of Thrift implies that 
shifting income from high- to low-saving groups increases output. The overall effect of devaluation on 
the domestic and foreign economies, therefore, depends on the consumption behavior of domestic and 
foreign workers and the degree of economic integration. 
Empirical studies on the national redistribution between wages and profits in open economies 
predominantly find that increasing openness pushes the economy in the profit-led direction. This finding 
is based on the fact that exports provide a demand source which is independent of workers' consumption. 
National redistribution is shown to have two effects: an internal between domestic wage and profit 
earners, and an external between domestic and foreign workers due to the redistribution-based real 
exchange rate movement. Depending on this external output effect, trade can shift the internal demand 
regime in either direction. If devaluation is expansionary, the demand regime becomes more wage-led. 
It is shown that this is the case if the Marshall-Lerner condition holds. 
The analysis of the paper is limited to the short run and the real side of the economy. Capital 
and financial stocks and their changes over time are not considered. An extension to the financial side 
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of the economy would have to include the introduction of interest rates and the determination of the 
nominal exchange rate which is assumed to be fixed in this model. In the medium run, balance of 
payment considerations as presented in Minsky (1983) and Taylor (2010) would inevitably lead to 
important interactions between financial stocks and real flows. These interactions and the investigation 
of the sustainability of growth trajectories are left to future research. 
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Appendix A   Social Accounting Matrix of the World Economy 
The model in Table 1 can be recast in a social accounting matrix illustrating the relationship 
between the inter-industry, national income and product, and flow-of-funds accounts.  As SAMs need 
to be evaluated at consistent prices, all entries are in real home units. With the real wage denoted as 𝜔𝜔 
and labor employed as 𝐿𝐿, it becomes clear that the world economy can be interpreted as a two-sector 
economy in which wage rates and profit shares differ across sectors because of barriers to mobility. 
 
  𝑿𝑿 𝑿𝑿∗ 𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝒘𝒘 𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝒘𝒘∗  𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝝅𝝅 𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝝅𝝅∗  𝑰𝑰 𝑰𝑰∗ 
Σ 
O
ut
pu
t u
se
s 
𝑿𝑿  𝑎𝑎−1 𝑎𝑎∗𝑃𝑃∗ (1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤) 𝜔𝜔 𝐿𝐿  (1 − 𝑠𝑠𝜋𝜋) 𝜋𝜋 𝑃𝑃  𝐼𝐼  𝑃𝑃 
𝑿𝑿∗ 𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃   𝑎𝑎−1 (1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤∗ ) 𝜔𝜔∗ 𝐿𝐿∗  𝑎𝑎−1(1 − 𝑠𝑠𝜋𝜋∗) 𝜋𝜋∗ 𝑃𝑃∗  𝑎𝑎−1𝐼𝐼 𝑎𝑎−1𝑃𝑃∗ 
𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝒘𝒘 𝑤𝑤 𝜔𝜔 𝐿𝐿        𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤 
𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝒘𝒘
∗   𝑎𝑎−1 𝑤𝑤∗ 𝜔𝜔∗ 𝐿𝐿∗       𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤∗  
𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝝅𝝅 𝜋𝜋 𝑃𝑃        𝑌𝑌𝜋𝜋 
𝑯𝑯𝑯𝑯𝝅𝝅
∗   𝑎𝑎−1 𝜋𝜋∗ 𝑃𝑃∗       𝑌𝑌𝜋𝜋∗ 
Home 
FoF   𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤 𝜔𝜔 𝐿𝐿  𝑠𝑠𝜋𝜋 𝜋𝜋 𝑃𝑃  −𝐼𝐼  0 
Foreign 
FoF    𝑎𝑎
−1 𝑠𝑠𝑤𝑤∗  𝜔𝜔∗ 𝐿𝐿∗  𝑎𝑎−1𝑠𝑠𝜋𝜋∗  𝜋𝜋∗ 𝑃𝑃∗  −𝑎𝑎−1𝐼𝐼 0 
 𝑃𝑃 𝑎𝑎−1𝑃𝑃∗ 𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤 𝑌𝑌𝑤𝑤∗  𝑌𝑌𝜋𝜋 𝑌𝑌𝜋𝜋∗ 0 0  
Table B.1: World Economy SAM 
 
 
 
Appendix B   Home and Foreign Price Level 
Restating equations (1) and (1*) in matrix notation yields 
�
(1 − 𝜋𝜋) −𝑎𝑎
−𝑎𝑎∗ (1 − 𝜋𝜋∗) � �1 00 𝑒𝑒 � � 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃∗� = � 𝑤𝑤 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤∗ 𝑤𝑤∗� 
which can be easily rearranged to solve for home and foreign macro prices 
� 𝑃𝑃
𝑃𝑃∗
�  = �1 00 𝑒𝑒 �−1 �(1 − 𝜋𝜋) −𝑎𝑎−𝑎𝑎∗ (1 − 𝜋𝜋∗) �−1 � 𝑤𝑤 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤∗ 𝑤𝑤∗�  
           = 1(1−𝜋𝜋)(1−𝜋𝜋∗)−𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎∗ �1 00 1/𝑒𝑒 � �(1 − 𝜋𝜋∗) 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎∗ (1 − 𝜋𝜋) � � 𝑤𝑤 𝑤𝑤𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤∗ 𝑤𝑤∗�  
           = 1(1−𝜋𝜋)(1−𝜋𝜋∗)−𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎∗ �(1 − 𝜋𝜋∗) 𝑤𝑤 𝑤𝑤 + 𝑒𝑒 𝑎𝑎 𝑤𝑤∗ 𝑤𝑤∗𝑎𝑎∗/𝑒𝑒 𝑤𝑤 𝑤𝑤 + (1 − 𝜋𝜋)𝑤𝑤∗ 𝑤𝑤∗� . 
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